Complete Works Page 5

  C.D.C. Reeve

  Jean Roberts

  T. M. Robinson

  Allan Silverman

  Simon Slings

  Nicholas P. White

  Paul Woodruff

  Donald J. Zeyl

  EUTHYPHRO

  Translated by G.M.A. Grube.

  The scene is the agora or central marketplace of Athens, before the offices of the magistrate who registers and makes preliminary inquiries into charges brought under the laws protecting the city from the gods’ displeasure. There Socrates meets Euthyphro—Socrates is on his way in to answer the charges of ‘impiety’ brought against him by three younger fellow citizens, on which he is going to be condemned to death, as we learn in the Apology. Euthyphro has just deposed murder charges against his own father for the death of a servant. Murder was a religious offense, since it entailed ‘pollution’ which if not ritually purified was displeasing to the gods; but equally, a son’s taking such action against his father might well itself be regarded as ‘impious’. Euthyphro professes to be acting on esoteric knowledge about the gods and their wishes, and so about the general topic of ‘piety’. Socrates seizes the opportunity to acquire from Euthyphro this knowledge of piety so that he can rebut the accusations against himself. However, like all his other interlocutors in Plato’s ‘Socratic’ dialogues, Euthyphro cannot answer Socrates’ questions to Socrates’ satisfaction, or ultimately to his own. So he cannot make it clear what piety is—though he continues to think that he does know it. Thus, predictably, Socrates’ hopes are disappointed; just when he is ready to press further to help Euthyphro express his knowledge, if indeed he does possess it, Euthyphro begs off on the excuse of business elsewhere.

  Though Socrates does not succeed in his quest, we readers learn a good deal about the sort of thing Socrates is looking for in asking his question ‘What is piety?’ and the other ‘What is … ?’ questions he pursues in other dialogues. He wants a single ‘model’ or ‘standard’ he can look to in order to determine which acts and persons are pious, one that gives clear, unconflicting, and unambiguous answers. He wants something that can provide such a standard all on its own—as one of Euthyphro’s proposals, that being pious is simply being loved by the gods, cannot do, since one needs to know first what the gods do love. Pious acts and people may indeed be loved by the gods, but that is a secondary quality, not the ‘essence’ of piety—it is not that which serves as the standard being sought.

  There seems no reason to doubt the character Socrates’ sincerity in probing Euthyphro’s statements so as to work out an adequate answer—he has in advance no answer of his own to test out or to advocate. But does the dialogue itself suggest to the attentive reader an answer of its own? Euthyphro frustrates Socrates by his inability to develop adequately his final suggestion, that piety is justice in relation to the gods, in serving and assisting them in some purpose or enterprise of their own. Socrates seems to find that an enticing idea. Does Plato mean to suggest that piety may be shown simply in doing one’s best to become as morally good as possible—something Socrates claims in the Apology the gods want more than anything else? If so, can piety remain an independent virtue at all, with its own separate standard for action? These are among the questions this dialogue leaves us to ponder.

  J.M.C.

  [2] EUTHYPHRO: What’s new, Socrates, to make you leave your usual haunts in the Lyceum and spend your time here by the king-archon’s court? Surely you are not prosecuting anyone before the king-archon as I am?

  SOCRATES: The Athenians do not call this a prosecution but an indictment, Euthyphro.

  [b] EUTHYPHRO: What is this you say? Someone must have indicted you, for you are not going to tell me that you have indicted someone else.

  SOCRATES: No indeed.

  EUTHYPHRO: But someone else has indicted you?

  SOCRATES: Quite so.

  EUTHYPHRO: Who is he?

  SOCRATES: I do not really know him myself, Euthyphro. He is apparently young and unknown. They call him Meletus, I believe. He belongs to the Pitthean deme, if you know anyone from that deme called Meletus, with long hair, not much of a beard, and a rather aquiline nose.

  EUTHYPHRO: I don’t know him, Socrates. What charge does he bring against you?

  [c] SOCRATES: What charge? A not ignoble one I think, for it is no small thing for a young man to have knowledge of such an important subject. He says he knows how our young men are corrupted and who corrupts them. He is likely to be wise, and when he sees my ignorance corrupting [d] his contemporaries, he proceeds to accuse me to the city as to their mother. I think he is the only one of our public men to start out the right way, for it is right to care first that the young should be as good as possible, just as a good farmer is likely to take care of the young plants first, and of the [3] others later. So, too, Meletus first gets rid of us who corrupt the young shoots, as he says, and then afterwards he will obviously take care of the older ones and become a source of great blessings for the city, as seems likely to happen to one who started out this way.

  EUTHYPHRO: I could wish this were true, Socrates, but I fear the opposite may happen. He seems to me to start out by harming the very heart of the city by attempting to wrong you. Tell me, what does he say you do to corrupt the young?

  SOCRATES: Strange things, to hear him tell it, for he says that I am a [b] maker of gods, and on the ground that I create new gods while not believing in the old gods, he has indicted me for their sake, as he puts it.

  EUTHYPHRO: I understand, Socrates. This is because you say that the divine sign keeps coming to you.1 So he has written this indictment against you as one who makes innovations in religious matters, and he comes to court to slander you, knowing that such things are easily misrepresented to the crowd. The same is true in my case. Whenever I speak of divine [c] matters in the assembly and foretell the future, they laugh me down as if I were crazy; and yet I have foretold nothing that did not happen. Nevertheless, they envy all of us who do this. One need not worry about them, but meet them head-on.

  SOCRATES: My dear Euthyphro, to be laughed at does not matter perhaps, for the Athenians do not mind anyone they think clever, as long as he does not teach his own wisdom, but if they think that he makes others to be like himself they get angry, whether through envy, as you say, or for [d] some other reason.

  EUTHYPHRO: I have certainly no desire to test their feelings towards me in this matter.

  SOCRATES: Perhaps you seem to make yourself but rarely available, and not be willing to teach your own wisdom, but I’m afraid that my liking for people makes them think that I pour out to anybody anything I have to say, not only without charging a fee but even glad to reward anyone who is willing to listen. If then they were intending to laugh at me, as [e] you say they laugh at you, there would be nothing unpleasant in their spending their time in court laughing and jesting, but if they are going to be serious, the outcome is not clear except to you prophets.

  EUTHYPHRO: Perhaps it will come to nothing, Socrates, and you will fight your case as you think best, as I think I will mine.

  SOCRATES: What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you the defendant or the prosecutor?

  EUTHYPHRO: The prosecutor.

  SOCRATES: Whom do you prosecute?

  EUTHYPHRO: One whom I am thought crazy to prosecute. [4]

  SOCRATES: Are you pursuing someone who will easily escape you?

  EUTHYPHRO: Far from it, for he is quite old.

  SOCRATES: Who is it?

  EUTHYPHRO: My father.

  SOCRATES: My dear sir! Your own father?

  EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

  SOCRATES: What is the charge? What is the case about?

  EUTHYPHRO: Murder, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Good heavens! Certainly, Euthyphro, most men would not [b] know how they could do this and be right. It is not the part of anyone to do this, but of one who is far advanced in wisdom.

  EUTHYPHRO: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, that is so.

  SOCRATES: Is then the man
your father killed one of your relatives? Or is that obvious, for you would not prosecute your father for the murder of a stranger.

  EUTHYPHRO: It is ridiculous, Socrates, for you to think that it makes any difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only watch whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him go, [c] but if not, one should prosecute, if, that is to say, the killer shares your hearth and table. The pollution is the same if you knowingly keep company with such a man and do not cleanse yourself and him by bringing him to justice. The victim was a dependent of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he was a servant of ours. He killed one of our household slaves in drunken anger, so my father bound him hand and foot and threw him [d] in a ditch, then sent a man here to inquire from the priest what should be done. During that time he gave no thought or care to the bound man, as being a killer, and it was no matter if he died, which he did. Hunger and cold and his bonds caused his death before the messenger came back from the seer. Both my father and my other relatives are angry that I am prosecuting my father for murder on behalf of a murderer when he hadn’t even killed him, they say, and even if he had, the dead man does not [e] deserve a thought, since he was a killer. For, they say, it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder. But their ideas of the divine attitude to piety and impiety are wrong, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Whereas, by Zeus, Euthyphro, you think that your knowledge of the divine, and of piety and impiety, is so accurate that, when those things happened as you say, you have no fear of having acted impiously in bringing your father to trial?

  EUTHYPHRO: I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would not [5] be superior to the majority of men, if I did not have accurate knowledge of all such things.

  SOCRATES: It is indeed most important, my admirable Euthyphro, that I should become your pupil, and as regards this indictment, challenge Meletus about these very things and say to him: that in the past too I considered knowledge about the divine to be most important, and that now that he [b] says that I am guilty of improvising and innovating about the gods I have become your pupil. I would say to him: “If, Meletus, you agree that Euthyphro is wise in these matters, consider me, too, to have the right beliefs and do not bring me to trial. If you do not think so, then prosecute that teacher of mine, not me, for corrupting the older men, me and his own father, by teaching me and by exhorting and punishing him.” If he is not convinced, and does not discharge me or indict you instead of me, I shall repeat the same challenge in court.

  EUTHYPHRO: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and, if he should try to indict me, I think I would find his weak spots and the talk in court would be about [c] him rather than about me.

  SOCRATES: It is because I realize this that I am eager to become your pupil, my dear friend. I know that other people as well as this Meletus do not even seem to notice you, whereas he sees me so sharply and clearly that he indicts me for ungodliness. So tell me now, by Zeus, what you just now maintained you clearly knew: what kind of thing do you say that godliness and ungodliness are, both as regards murder and other things; [d] or is the pious not the same and alike in every action, and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents us with one form or appearance in so far as it is impious?

  EUTHYPHRO: Most certainly, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Tell me then, what is the pious, and what the impious, do you say?

  EUTHYPHRO: I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else; [e] not to prosecute is impious. And observe, Socrates, that I can cite powerful evidence that the law is so. I have already said to others that such actions are right, not to favor the ungodly, whoever they are. These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, yet they agree that [6] he bound his father because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he in turn castrated his father for similar reasons. But they are angry with me because I am prosecuting my father for his wrong doing. They contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and about me.

  SOCRATES: Indeed, Euthyphro, this is the reason why I am a defendant in the case, because I find it hard to accept things like that being said about the gods, and it is likely to be the reason why I shall be told I do wrong. Now, however, if you, who have full knowledge of such things, share [b] their opinions, then we must agree with them, too, it would seem. For what are we to say, we who agree that we ourselves have no knowledge of them? Tell me, by the god of friendship, do you really believe these things are true?

  EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, and so are even more surprising things, of which the majority has no knowledge.

  SOCRATES: And do you believe that there really is war among the gods, and terrible enmities and battles, and other such things as are told by the [c] poets, and other sacred stories such as are embroidered by good writers and by representations of which the robe of the goddess is adorned when it is carried up to the Acropolis? Are we to say these things are true, Euthyphro?

  EUTHYPHRO: Not only these, Socrates, but, as I was saying just now, I will, if you wish, relate many other things about the gods which I know will amaze you.

  SOCRATES: I should not be surprised, but you will tell me these at leisure some other time. For now, try to tell me more clearly what I was asking [d] just now, for, my friend, you did not teach me adequately when I asked you what the pious was, but you told me that what you are doing now, in prosecuting your father for murder, is pious.

  EUTHYPHRO: And I told the truth, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Perhaps. You agree, however, that there are many other pious actions.

  EUTHYPHRO: There are.

  SOCRATES: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious [e] actions pious through one form, or don’t you remember?

  EUTHYPHRO: I do.

  SOCRATES: Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it and, using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not.

  EUTHYPHRO: If that is how you want it, Socrates, that is how I will tell you.

  SOCRATES: That is what I want.

  [7] EUTHYPHRO: Well then, what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious.

  SOCRATES: Splendid, Euthyphro! You have now answered in the way I wanted. Whether your answer is true I do not know yet, but you will obviously show me that what you say is true.

  EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

  SOCRATES: Come then, let us examine what we mean. An action or a man dear to the gods is pious, but an action or a man hated by the gods is impious. They are not the same, but quite opposite, the pious and the impious. Is that not so?

  EUTHYPHRO: It is indeed.

  SOCRATES: And that seems to be a good statement?

  [b] EUTHYPHRO: I think so, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: We have also stated that the gods are in a state of discord, that they are at odds with each other, Euthyphro, and that they are at enmity with each other. Has that, too, been said?

  EUTHYPHRO: It has.

  SOCRATES: What are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and anger? Let us look at it this way. If you and I were to differ about numbers as to which is the greater, would this difference make us enemies and [c] angry with each other, or would we proceed to count and soon resolve our difference about this?

  EUTHYPHRO: We would certainly do so.

  SOCRATES: Again, if we differed about the larger and the smaller, we would turn to measurement and soon cease to differ.

  EUTHYPHRO: That is so.

  SOCRATES: And about the heavier and the lighter, we would resort to weighing and be reconciled.

  EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

  SOCRATES: What subject of di
fference would make us angry and hostile to each other if we were unable to come to a decision? Perhaps you do not have an answer ready, but examine as I tell you whether these subjects [d] are the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad. Are these not the subjects of difference about which, when we are unable to come to a satisfactory decision, you and I and other men become hostile to each other whenever we do?

  EUTHYPHRO: That is the difference, Socrates, about those subjects.

  SOCRATES: What about the gods, Euthyphro? If indeed they have differences, will it not be about these same subjects?

  EUTHYPHRO: It certainly must be so.

  SOCRATES: Then according to your argument, my good Euthyphro, different [e] gods consider different things to be just, beautiful, ugly, good, and bad, for they would not be at odds with one another unless they differed about these subjects, would they?

  EUTHYPHRO: You are right.

  SOCRATES: And they like what each of them considers beautiful, good, and just, and hate the opposites of these?

  EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

  SOCRATES: But you say that the same things are considered just by some gods and unjust by others, and as they dispute about these things they [8] are at odds and at war with each other. Is that not so?

  EUTHYPHRO: It is.

  SOCRATES: The same things then are loved by the gods and hated by the gods, and would be both god-loved and god-hated.

  EUTHYPHRO: It seems likely.

  SOCRATES: And the same things would be both pious and impious, according to this argument?

  EUTHYPHRO: I’m afraid so.

  SOCRATES: So you did not answer my question, you surprising man. I did not ask you what same thing is both pious and impious, and it appears that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. So it is in no way [b] surprising if your present action, namely punishing your father, may be pleasing to Zeus but displeasing to Cronus and Uranus, pleasing to Hephaestus but displeasing to Hera, and so with any other gods who differ from each other on this subject.